Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General v. Utah State Retirement Board, Et al. : Respondent University Medical Center Trust Fund, First Security Bank of Utah, Trustee : Brief of Respondent Utah State Insurance Fund by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General v. Utah State
Retirement Board, Et al. : Respondent University
Medical Center Trust Fund, First Security Bank of
Utah, Trustee : Brief of Respondent Utah State
Insurance Fund
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
ROBERT D. MOORE, WILLIAM T. EVANS, MERLIN LYBBERT, FRANK V. NELSON, MARK
A. MADSEN; Attorneys for Respondents;ROBERT B. HANSEN, WILLIAM GIBBS, BERNARD
M. TANNER; Attorneys for Appellant
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Board, No. 16851 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2093
... ~~ ---=- :::-:=3ME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, 
Attorney General, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 16851 
16714 
16560 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UTAH STATE INSURANCE FUND 
Appeal from the Decision of the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Christine M. Durham 
ROBERT D. MOORE 
Black & Moore 
500 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondent 
State Insurance Fund 
WILLIAM T. EVANS 
Assistant Attorney General 
25 South Wolcott 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 
Attorney for Respondent 
University of Utah 
MERLIN LYBBERT 
Attorney at Law 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondent University 
Medical Center Trust Fund 
FRANK V. NELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent Utah 
State Industrial Commission 
MARK A. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
540 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attornev for Respondent Utah 
~~~~~~ ~:~~~~~~~~kts ~~,~,3rd 
FILED 
JUL 2 8 1980 
~ ....... 0 .......................... - .. --- ... -----··--------'"'·'"'~··: 
ClDrk~ Suprnm!:' Court, Utah 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM GIBBS 
BERNARD M. TANNER 
Assistant Attorneys General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.... ·- --ME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, 
Attorney General, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 16851 
16714 
16560 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UTAH STATE INSURANCE FUND 
Appeal from the Decision of the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Christine M. Durham 
ROBERT D. MOORE 
Black & Moore 
500 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondent 
State Insurance Fund 
WILLIAM T. EVANS 
Assistant Attorney General 
25 South Wolcott 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 
Attorney for Respondent 
University of Utah 
MERLIN LYBBERT 
Attorney at Law 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondent University 
Medical Center Trust Fund 
FRANK V. NELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent Utah 
State Industrial Commission 
MARK A. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
540 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Respondent Utah 
._ rd 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM GIBBS 
BERNARD M. TANNER 
Assistant Attorneys General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE" OF THE CASE • & • • • D • G 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL . . ~ . . . . . . 
FACTS • • 
ARGUMENT 
CONCLUSION 
. . . . . . . . . 
POINT I. SECTION 35-3-1 OF THE UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED AUTHORIZES THE STATE INSURANCE 
FUND TO HIRE PRIVATE COUNSEL AND SAID 
STATUTE IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION . • • • • • • • . • • . 
POINT II. TO ALLOW THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO 
REPRESENT THE STATE INSURANCE FUND WOULD BE 
A VIOLATION OF THE STATE INSURANCE FUND'S 
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW AS 
GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, AND AMENDMENT 14 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES • 
. . . . . . . . . 
CASES CITED 
Chez v. Industrial Commission, 67 P.2d 549, 
Page 
1 
1 
2 
2 
8 
8 
13 
15 
90 u 447 (1936) • • • • • • . . • . • . . . . 6' 11, 12 
Gronning v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977) •••• 
Hans en v. Bar low , 2 3 U. 2 d 4 7 , 4 5 6 P • 2 d 177 
., • 6 f 12 I 14 
. . . . 8 
Hansen v. Legal Services Committee of the 
Utah State Legislature, 19 U.2d 231, 
429 P.2d 979 ••••••.•••••.•.••••••• 9, 10 
Hern v. Utah Li'fuor Control Commission, 
549 P.2d 242 Utah 1976) •••••• 
Intermountain Smelting v. Anthony Capitano, 
Sup. Ct. No. 16530 (March 24, 1980) ••• 
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
12 
6 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Yelle, 329 P.2d 841 (Wash. 1958) • . . . . . . . . 
State Tax Commission of Utah v. Department 
of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978) • • • • • • • • 2 , 
White, et al. v. Industrial. Conunission, 
604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1979) •••..•• . . . . . . . . . . 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 35-1-1, U.C.A. (1953) , as amended . 
Section 35-1-68, u.c.A. (1953), as amended . . . . . . 
Section 35-1-69, u.c.A. (1953) ' as amended . . . 
Section 35-2-1, u.c.A. (1953), as amended . . . . 
Section .35-3-1, U.C.A. (1953) I as amended . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED 
United States Constitution, Amendment 14 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 2 • . . . . 
Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 27 . 
Utah Constitution, Article VII, Section 18 
2' 
4, 
Page 
10 
3, 4, 
6 
14 
5 
5 
2 
8, 10 
13 
13 
11 
9 
Utah Constitution, Article XXIV, Section 12 • 9, 10 
Washington Constitution, Article II, Section 21 . 
Washington Constitution, Article III, Section 1 
; i 
10 
11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, 
Attorney General, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
and UTAH STATE RETIREMENT 
FUND; UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, and UTAH STATE 
INSURANCE FUND; and UNIVERSITY: 
OF UTAH, for and in behalf of 
the UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
HOSPITAL for the UNIVERSITY 
MEDICAL CENTER; UNIVERSITY 
MEDICAL CENTER TRUST FUND, 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
TRUSTEE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 16851 
16714 
16560 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UTAH STATE INSURANCE FUND 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff, Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, filed numerous complaints against State agencies 
and what he refers to as "quasi-state entities and funds" (R. 
16560, p. 3), claiming that each of these entities has 
retained legal counsel. He contends that such action is 
improper under the Utah Constitution and that the statutory 
provisions allowing such (which in the case of the Respondent 
have been in existence for some time) are unconstitutional. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Plaintiff-Appellant appeals from the District Court's 
granting Defendant-Respondent Utah State Insurance Fund's Motion Sponsored by the S.J. Qui ney Law Library. Funding for digitiz tion provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for Summary Judgment. This case is part of a consolidated 
appeal wherein both Judge Christine M. Durham and Judge Homer 
F. Wilkinson granted summary judgment to various Defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Utah State Insurance Fund seeks af f irmance of Judge 
Christine M. Durham's Order of October 24, 1979, granting a 
summary judgment. 
FACTS 
Throughout the pleadings in this case an~ in Appellant's 
brief, many different statements are made attempting to characte1 : 
the State Insurance Fund. One need not conjecture as to its 
nature and status because this Court in numerous opinions, which 
will be delineated herein, has described the nature of this Fund. 
I 
In essence, the Fund is nothing more than an insurance company i I 
I 
authorized to collect premiums from employers to provide 
insurance coverage for injuries and diseases of employees that 
are work related and are covered by the Utah Workman's Compensati 
Act, Section 35-1-1, et seq., U.C.A., 1953, as amended, and the 
Utah Occupational Disease Act, Section 35-2-1, et seq., u.c.A., 
1953, as amended. (See State Tax Commission of Utah v. Departmer 
of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978). 
The Appellant strains in contending that the State Insurancf 
I 
Fund is a typical state agency operated by a state officer in 
performing a traditional function of government. The 
fact of the matter is that the Fund is totally financed, not onij 
in its administration but in the benefits paid, by private funds! 
of premium paying employers. There is no liability on the 
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part of the State and no public money whatsoever is used by 
the Fund either in its operation or in the benefits given to 
eligible employees. Any debt owed by the Fund is not subject 
to reimbursement or indemnification by the State. (State Tax 
Conunission v. Department of Finance, supra.) The Fund was 
established in this state (as in most states) to provide a 
vehicle for employers to insure themselves against compensation 
and occupationsl disease claims. The employers voluntarily entered 
into their agreement with the State Insurance Fund by the contri-
bution of their premiums. The State Insurance Fund is in 
competition with many private insurance companies who afford 
compensation benefits. (R. 16560, pp. 82-84) 
Historically the State Insurance Fund has been administered 
by different entities. For example, during a period of its 
history, it was administered by the Industrial Conunission. 
Because of the inherent conflicts in such administration, the 
Legislature determined it appropriate to be administered by the 
Commission of Finance and subsequent to its abolishment by the 
Director of Finance. The Director of Finance administers said 
Fund as a custodian and/or trustee of the State Insurance Fund. 
The appellant begrudgingly admits to the holdings of the 
Supreme Court by stating that, " ... this court has referred 
to the State Insurance Fund as being analagous to private 
insurers" (Brief, p. 20), but then blithely states without any 
supporting authority that, "A fundamental difference, however, 
between the State Insurance Fund and private insurance enterprises 
is that the latter enjoys legal standing while the former does not. 
-~-
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Private insurers are generally corporations or partnerships 
with legal standing, but the State Insurance Fund ... is 
little more than an inanimate collection of funds." From 
this statement, appellant indicates that the State Insurance 
Fund thus has no legal capacity. Such unsupported assumption 
is negated in State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, 
supra, which states 
The assets of the Fund exist only to 
cover the identical obligations covered by 
private insurers. The Fund has the same 
administrative costs as private insurers: 
establishment of premium and hazard rates, 
procedures for analyzing claims and making 
disbursements, reinsurance considerations, 
Fund investment decisions, collection 
procedures, legal fees and policy issuance. 
These administrative costs, and other 
expenses are deducted from the Fund by 
legislative appropriations of Fund money. 
The Fund has the same rights to sue and 
be sued and make contracts that a private 
insurer has. The Fund enjoys no immunities 
not provided to private insurers." 
(Empahsis added) 
For a long period of time, the State Insurance Fund has 
been represented by private counsel. When a dispute arises as 
to whether or not an employee is entitled to benefits, a hearing 
is held before an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission. There are in excess of 200 such hearings yearly 
involving claims against employers who have coverage with the 
Fund. (R. 16560, p. 82-83) In all of these hearings, the 
Fund, as other insurance companies in their hearings, has 
been represented by private counsel. The authority for the 
employment of counsel is granted by Section 35-3-1, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended. such statute provides as follows: 
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There shall be maintained a fund, to be 
known as the state insurance fund, for the purpose 
of insuring employers against liability for 
compensation based upon compensable accidental 
injuries and against liability for compensation 
on account of occupational diseases, and of 
assuring to the persons entitled thereto the 
compensation, provided by law. Such fund shall 
consist of all premiums and penalties received 
and paid into the fund, of property and securities 
acquired by and through the use of moneys belonging 
to the fund, and of interest earned upon money 
belonging to the fund and deposited or invested 
as herein provided. There shall be no 1£ability 
on the part of the state beyond the amount of such 
fund. Such fund shall be applicable to the 
payment of losses sustained on account of insurance, 
to the payment of compensation, and to the payment 
of salaries and other expenses charged against it 
in accordance with the provisions of this title. 
The administrative expenses required in administering 
this act shall be provided for by legislative 
appropriation from the resources of the state 
insurance fund. The commission shall prepare and 
submit to the governor, to be included in his budget 
to the legislature, a budget of the requirements in 
carrying out the provision of law for the 
biennium next following the convening of the 
legislature. In the conduct and administration 
of the business of said fund the commission of 
finance may appoint with the approval of the 
governor, a manager, and may employ accountants, 
inspectors, attorneys, physicians, investigators, 
clerks, stenographers, and such other experts and 
assistants as it deems advisable. (Emphasis added) 
In addition to the hearings, a number of the decisions by 
the Industrial Commission are reviewed by the Supreme Court. 
Also, at many of the hearings a claim is asserted either by the 
applicant or by the insurance carrier against the so-called 
"Special Fund" or Second Injury Fund which is provided for in 
Sections 35-1-68 and 35-1-69, U. C. A., 1953, as amended. At 
either of these junctions in the proceedings, the Attorney 
General's office is legal counsel for and on behalf of the 
Industrial Commission. If the Attorney General is successful 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in his allegations in this case, he would be representing both 
sides of the action; that is, the Special Fund or Second Injury 
Fund and the Utah State Insurance Fund, which are in a contrary 
position. (As an example, see Intermountain Smelting v. 
Anthony Capitano, Sup. Ct. No. 16530 (March 24, 1980) and 
White et al. v. Industrial Commission, 604 P.2d 478 (Utah 
1979) 
As mentioned earlier, much comment and theory as to the 
nature of the Fund is made by Appellant. However, the 
nature of the Fund has been settled by decisions of this 
Court. In an early decision which has been cited with approval 
in recent cases (see Groning v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977)) 1 
is Chez v. Industrial Commission case, 67 P.2d 549, 90 U 447 (19J 
Chez defines the State Insurance Fund in very clear terms and 
I 
its relationship to the State. The Court stated: 
..• (t)he nature of the fund (is) one derived from 
premiums and penalties payable by employers. And 
what is it expended for? It is paid on account 
of the employer for compensation for which he 
is primarily liable. The employer really pools 
his premiums in the State Fund to create a fund 
for the payment of an obligation for which it 
is liable. It is a common fund belonging to 
the participating employers. It is therefore 
not derived from anything owing to the state nor 
paid out on behalf of any state obligations. The 
coming into the fund is voluntary. If employers 
band together and form their own fund with a 
management selected by them, which fund would pay 
their compensation liability, there would be no 
question as to the nature of the fund. It would 
not then even be public moneys in the sense that 
it was in custody of and managed by a public 
body or held by a public official. Change the 
situation somewhat. The Legislature provides 
for workmen's compensation, a social and public 
purpose. The end it desired to accomplish was 
to see that workmen incapacitated by industrial 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
accidents or their dependents in case of an 
industrial death were paid something to live on. 
Not so much to accomplish this end as to assure 
its accomplishment, the Legislature required the 
compensation risk to be insured. It provided 
in cases of financially able employers for self-
insurance. Those not obtaining the privilege of 
self-insurance could either insure in a private 
carrier or in a fund which the Legislature 
provided for, consisting of employers' contri-
butions or premiums. 
* * * * * 
But basically it is no different than if the state 
and a number of private employers agreed to establish 
their own fund. 
* * * * * 
It was a venture by the state as an employer and 
certain private employers who choose to come in, 
in which they pooled their premiums to create a 
fund for the purpose of paying, not a state 
obligation or making expenditures on behalf of 
the state, but of paying their own contingent 
compensation liabilities. 
* * * * * 
If the Legislature decided to discontinue the 
State Fund, upon liquidation anything not needed 
to pay contingencies would be returned to the 
contributing employers. The fund is publicly 
administered, but its debtors are not debtors 
to the contributing employers for their mutual 
benefit. It constitutes a pooling of risks 
under the auspices of the state. 
* * * * * 
It is an insurance business for the benefit and 
accommodation of the contributing employers. It 
provides a means for meeting an obligation placed 
on them by the Legislature. . . (Emphasis added) 
(Citations omitted) 
-7-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SECTION 35-3-1 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED AUTHORIZES 
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND TO HIRE PRIVATE COUNSEL AND SAID 
STATUTE IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Section 35-3-1, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, specifically 
allows the State Insurance Fund to appoint its own counsel. 
The issue presented by this case is whether or not said statute 
is unconstitutional. The Appellant first bases his argument 
on the theory that Hansen v. Barlow, 23 ~.2d 47, 456 P.2d 177, 
gives him some aid and comfort in asserting the unconstitutional' 
of the specific statutory authority to hire counsel. 
Much to do is made of the fact that the Attorney General 
of the State of Utah has certain common law powers and duties, 
and as such, it is urged that that is germaine to the issue 
on appeal. Respondents respectfully suggest that they have 
no quarrel with this legal proposition but suggest that it is 
immaterial here since the issue facing the court in Hansen v. 
Barlow, supra, was whether or not the Attorney General has 
inherent standing to test the constitutionality of newly 
enacted statutes. The Court held that he does. No one has 
claimed in this case that the Attorney General did not have 
standing to bring this lawsuit. The citing of Hansen v. Barlow, 
supra, therefore, is not helpful in deciding the issue 
presented in this case. 
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The Appellant, however, cites as his most persuasive 
authority that the statute in question is unconstitutional 
based upon the case of Hansen v. Legal Services Committee 
of the Utah State Legislature, 19 U.2d 231, 429 P.2d 979. 
It is the position of the State Insurance Fund that this 
case does not sustain the proposition urged for it, but 
rather supports Respondent's position that the statute in 
question is constitutional. In that case, the Supreme Court 
in a rather cryptic opinion was faced with the issue of 
whether or not a statute creating a legal adviser for the 
legislature was constitutional. The Court held that 
said statute was unconstitutional for the following reasons: 
Article VII, Section 18, under "Duties of Attorney General" 
states, "The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser of 
the State officers, and shall perform such other duties as 
may be provided by law". Article XXIV, Section 12, states as 
follows: 
The State Officers to be voted for at the 
time of the adoption of this Constitution, 
shall be a Governor, Secretary of State, 
State Auditor, State Treasurer, Attorney 
General, Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
Members of the Senate and House of Representa-
tives, three Supreme Judges, nine District 
Judges, and a Representative to Congress. 
The Court held, "That these two provisions are crystal 
clear and effectively should dispose of the matter." The 
Court by referring to Article XXIV, Section 12, of the 
Constitution for the definition of State Officers negates 
the claim of Appellant because it is clear that legal counsel 
n 
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for the Fund does not represent or purport to represent any 
of the above enumerated elected offices. The constitutional 
provision cited above does not say that the Attorney General 
will be the legal.adviser of the State boards, state agencies 
and trust funds, let alone the Director of Finance acting in 
his capacity as custodian or trustee for the State Insurance 
Fund. 
In order to sustain the position that the statute in 
question is unconstitutional, one is required to enlarge the 
definition of State officers to a category not mentioned and 
not included in the Constitution. The validity of §35-3-1, 
supra, is not reasonably subject to such an attack. It is 
clear that Hansen v. Legal Services, supra, sustains Respondent'1 
position in its holding that State officers are defined in I 
Article 24, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution. 
An interesting case in this regard is State v. Yelle, 
329 P.2d 841 (Wash. 1958), wherein the issue presented to 
the Supreme Court of Washington was whether or not the 
constitutional provision making the Attorney General legal 
adviser for state officers and the further provision requiring 
State officers to be qualified electors were sufficient to 
negate a warrant for the payment to the Western Interstate 
Commission for Higher Education. Article II, Section 21 of 
the Washington Constitution is the same as the Utah Constitution,\ 
and it provides as follows: 
The Attorney General shall be the legal 
adviser of the state officers, .•. 
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Article III, Section 1, of their constitution provides 
as follows: 
The executive department shall consist 
of a governor, lieutenant governor, 
secretary of state, treasurer, auditor, 
attorney general, superintendent of 
public instruction, and a commissioner 
of public lands, who shall be severally 
chosen by the qualified electors of 
the state * * *· 
The Washington Supreme Court held that Constitutional references 
to "State officers" applied only to elective officers and 
that since Interstate Higher Educational Commissioners were 
appointed positions they would not be considered state 
officers within the contemplation of the Washington Constitution. 
In essence, the Washington Court in dealing with similar 
constitutional provisions did not feel it appropriate to 
enlarge a definition of state officers specifically named 
in the precise language of the Constitution. 
The Respondent believes that the above argument is 
sufficient to be dispositive of the issue here in this case. 
It is submitted, however, that the State Insurance Fund's 
position is stronger than other agencies or entities may be 
because of the applicable case law. We cite again Chez v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, supra. It should be noted 
in this case that the Court was concerned about the effect of 
Section 27, Article VI, which states: 
The legislature shall have no power to 
release or extinguish, in whole or in 
part, the indebtedness, liability or 
obligation of any corporation or person 
to the state or to any municipal 
corporation ther.ein. 
-11-
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In Chez there was an application to prohibit the 
cancellation of some municipal bonds of the State Insurance 
Fund. Justice Wolfe initially stated that this case would 
not be controlling regarding other governmental entities because 
of the nature of the Fund. The Court stated: 
It was rather presumed that the decision 
in this case would be guidance to all 
officers, boards, departments and 
commissions . . . as will be seen by 
what is later set out hereunder, this 
decision rests on special facts and 
can form no such general rule of 
guidance. 
The Court then went on to state that the constitutional 
prohibition was not controlling because the nature of the I 
Fund is such that an obligation owing to it is not an obligation: 
or liability of the state. Also see Gronning v. Smart, supra, 
that holds that the State Insurance Fund is a trust fund and 
may not be considered an arm of the state. 
The Respondent feels it appropriate to point out that if 
the Attorney General prevailed in this instance that an intoler~ 
condition would exist. The Attorney General would be representin 
both sides of a conflict, one involving an employer's trust 
fund, and one a state agency, i.e., the Industrial Commission 
and/or the Special Fund. Such a conflict of interest would 
at the very minimum be ill advised. See Hern v. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission, 549 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976). 
-12-
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POINT II. 
TO ALLOW THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO REPRESENT THE STATE 
INSURANCE FUND WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE STATE INSURANCE 
FUND'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW AS GUARANTEED 
BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, AND 
AMENDMENT 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The cases cited previously and discussed more fully herein 
have struck down unconstitutional acts of the legislature that 
would treat the State Insurance Fund as a governmental entity. In 
construing the applicable provisions of the State Constitution 
concerning the Fund's legal representation, one must consider 
Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution of Utah. For example, in 
State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297, 
(Utah 1978), the State Tax Commission brought an action for 
enforcement of a special tax imposed solely upon the State 
Insurance Fund. The District Court entered its summary 
judgment declaring the tax to be unconstitutional and the 
Tax Commission appealed. A unanimous Supreme Court sustained 
the lower court with the following language: 
To assure the availability of funds when 
injury occurs, employers are required by 
law to secure compensation through one 
of three ways: (1) the State Insurance 
Fund; (2) private insurance carriers; or 
(3) self-insurance. Participation in the 
State Insurance Fund is therefore voluntary, 
and although publicly administered, it is 
a private trust fund to be used to meet 
liabilities of various employers when an 
employee is entitled to compensation •.. 
(t)he State Insurance Fund is required to 
pay a tax of 1 percent of the total premiums 
it receives. This tax law was passed in 1971 
and only to the State Insurance Fund. 
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The thrust of the Tax Commission's claim is 
that the Fund is different and therefore 
may be treated differently from other insurers. 
Equal protection protects against discrimination 
within a class. The legislature has considerable 
discretion in the designation of classifications 
but the court must determine whether such 
classifications operate equally on all persons 
similarly situated. The State Insurance Fund 
has been singled out from among a larger class 
of insurers to pay a tax imposed upon no one 
else which must be considered to be arbitrary 
and constitutionally prohibited. Examples of 
the similarities between the Fund and others 
within its class include the following. The 
assets of the Fund exist only to cover the 
identical obligations covered by private 
insurers. The Fund has the same administrative 
costs as private insurers: establishment of 
premium and hazard rates, procedures for 
analyzing claims and making disbursements, 
reinsurance considerations, Fund investment 
decisions, collection procedures, legal fees 
and policy issuance. These administrative 
costs, and other expenses are deducted from 
the Fund by legislative appropriations of Fund 
money. The Fund has the same rights to sue 
and be sued and make contracts that a private 
insurer has. The Fund enjoys no immunities not 
provided to private insurers. 
(Emphasis added) (Citations omitted) 
Also see Gronning v. Smart, supra, wherein the legislature 
attempted to appropriate funds from the State Insurance Fund 
for the use of a state agency; that is, the Industrial 
Commission. The Court held that this was improper because of 
the nature of the Fund and specifically held that the State 
Insurance Fund is not an arm of the state requiring it to 
provide for certain safety measures. 
Therefore, in considering the constitutionality of 
35-1-1, one should recognize that the State Insurance Fund 
is entitled to.Equal Protection under the law, a proposition 
_lA-
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reaffirmed by this Court. A conclusion that the State 
Insurance Fund is not entitled to its inherent and statutory 
right to its own counsel creates a distinction between the 
State Insurance Fund and other insurance carriers in the 
class of worker's compensation insurance provides that is 
not constitutionally supportable. Expressed in basic terms, 
the employers who have contributed to the trust fund would 
not be given the same right to counsel independent of the 
conflicts of interest inherent in having the Attorney General's 
office representing both sides of issues on both the administrative 
and appellate court levels in workman's compensation cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The State Insurance Fund has specific statutory authority 
to be represented by private attorneys. The Fund is uniquely 
not a governmental entity but rather a privately owned fund 
not subject to constitutional provisions that by definition 
apply only to governmental entities. It would be a denial of 
due process and equal protection to have the Attorney General 
act mandatorially as counsel for the Fund. 
It is therefore submitted to the Court that Appellant's 
case is without merit and the decision of the court below should 
be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 1980. 
BLACK & MOORE 
By 
=R~o=B=E=R=T~D-.--M~O~o=RE----------~--~~~ 
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By-=---=-~~~~------~~~~~~~---
J AMES R. BLACK 
Attorneys for Respondent Utah State 
Insurance Fund 
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